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Abstract:  We  analyze  the  formation  of  environmental  policy  to  regulate 
transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency 
framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political support-
maximizing  governments  that  are  in  a  situation  of  strategic  interaction  with 
respect  to  their  environmental  policies,  but  too  small  to  affect  world  market 
prices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimal 
environmental  policies.  Taxes  may  be  too  high  if  environmental  interests  and 
pollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellations 
they may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of a 
polluting  good.  Politically  motivated  environmental  policy  thus  may  be  more 
harmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators’ solution. In 
other  cases  it  may  enhance  environmental  quality  and  welfare  beyond  what  a 
benevolent government would achieve.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines how lobby groups in pluralistic societies affect the determination of 
environmental policy when countries are linked through transboundary pollution and their 
political  support  maximizing  governments  are  unable  to  alter  prices  on  the  global  goods 
markets through their policies.  
It is widely recognized that environmental policy formation is influenced by lobby groups. 
Environmental lobby groups are present at international conferences for instance at Kyoto, 
Copenhagen  or  Cancún;  they  also  affect  the  formulation  of  national  policies  such  as 
regulation  of  air  or  water  pollution.  While  environmental  lobby  groups  advocate  stricter 
environmental standards, industry associations often lobby for lower standards in order to 
retain competitiveness in international markets. Governments seeking to maximize political 
support respond systematically to such lobbying.
1 The resulting equilibrium regulation differs 
considerably  from  the  Pigouvian  rule,  thus  creating  a  politically  motivated  distortion  of 
environmental policy (Aidt 1998).  
Due to the scale of economic activity, pollution often spills over to neighboring countries 
making  national  environmental  policies  relevant  for  adjacent  countries  as  well. 
Transboundary pollution has become a serious challenge over the past decades, especially in 
East Asia: In China sulphur oxide emissions increased by 53% between 2000 and 2006 and 
spilled over to Southwest Japan (Lu et al. 2010). Ichikawa and Fujita (1995) estimate that 
China's  contribution  to  wet  sulphate  deposition  in  Japan  represent  50%  of  the  total. 
Furthermore, anthropogenic NOx emissions over Asia have more than doubled since 1985 
(Akimoto 2003). This increase in emissions has created atmospheric brown clouds. They are 
fuelled  by  emissions  of  two  or  more  countries  in  the  region  and  affect  those  countries 
negatively. Brown clouds “start as indoor and outdoor air pollution consisting of particles and 
pollutant  gases,  such  as  nitrogen  oxides  (NOx),  carbon  monoxide  (CO),  sulphur  dioxide 
(SO2), ammonia (NH3), and hundreds of organic gases and acids” (Ramanathan et al. 2008). 
They affect many small countries. Their hotspots are in East Asia, Indo-Gangetic Plain in 
South  Asia,  Southeast  Asia,  Southern  Africa,  and  the  Amazon  Basin.  They  have  severe 
environmental impacts as, for instance, they accelerate the meltdown of Himalayan glaciers, 
decrease crop yields by as much as 20%, or result in over 330.000 deaths per year in China 
                                                 
1 Cf. Binder and Neumayer (2005) and Fredriksson et al. (2005) for empirical evidence on the political influence 
of environmental lobby groups and List and Sturm (2006) on the relative importance of voters and lobby groups 
for environmental policies of US states.   
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and India alone, as their particles cause pulmonary illnesses and chronic respiratory problems 
(Ramanathan et al. 2008). 
Another example for multi-directional transboundary pollution affecting small countries is 
Scandinavian SO2 depositions, which are dependent to a high degree on the emission activity 
in neighboring countries. While all Scandinavian countries apply emission taxes, actual tax 
rates differ very strongly. Cansier and Krumm (1997) find that tax rates in Sweden are three 
times higher than in Denmark, which is only partly due to abatement cost differentials and 
therefore is hardly explained by welfare-maximizing behavior alone.
 2 
Such transboundary pollution gives rise to a second distortion (in addition to the political 
distortion described above), if national environmental policies remain non-cooperative: even 
welfare maximizing governments would internalize the externalities only to the extent that 
they affect their own country (Markussen 1975). Yet, how do these two distortions interact? 
How do politically-motivated, self-interested governments set environmental policies in the 
presence of transboundary pollution? Governments respond to lobbying efforts of opposing 
lobby groups and at the same time are in a situation of strategic interaction with neighboring 
governments that are likewise seeking to maximize their political support. This is the concern 
of our paper. 
Our study adds to the literature on endogenous environmental policy. Fredriksson (1997) 
analyzes  the  effects  of  world  price  changes  and  lobbying  on  the  politically  optimal 
environmental tax rate. He shows that pollution may increase in presence of an abatement 
subsidy because the pollution tax is reduced due to a change in lobbying influence. Schleich 
(1997) introduces a second policy instrument and analyzes the choice between domestic taxes  
and tariffs when the externality is in production or consumption.
3 Aidt (1998) assumes that 
pollution  stems  from  the  use  of  an  input  rather  than  production  and  demonstrates  how  a 
politically  optimizing  government  deviates  from  the  social  optimum  in  deciding  on  its 
environmental policy.
4 Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) analyze the effects of interaction of 
corruption  and  political  instability  on  endogenous  environmental  policy.  They  show  that 
political  instability  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  stringency  of  environmental  policy  if 
                                                 
2  A  related  example  is  the  environmental  degradation  of  the  Baltic  Sea:  It  is  affected  by  fishing,  riverine 
pollution,  and  atmospheric  nitrogen  deposition  from  the  neighboring  states  (Helcom  2010).  Gren  (2001) 
demonstrates the inefficiency of uncoordinated environmental policy for the Baltic Sea.  
3 Schleich and Orden (1999) generalize the small economy case to the large economy setting. 
4 Hillman and Ursprung (1994) analyze the influence of environmental concerns on endogenous trade policy, but 
they do not study environmental policy formation. Bommer and Schulze (1997) consider the effect of trade 
liberalization on endogenous trade policy.   
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corruption is low and a positive effect if corruption is high. Damania et al. (2003)  show inter 
alia that the effect of trade liberalization on environmental regulation is affected by corruption 
levels.  
These papers use a common agency model to portray the political game that determines 
environmental  policy.  Yet,  they  do  not  take  into  account  the  strategic  interaction  that 
governments are exposed to in the international arena, when deciding on their environmental 
policies.  Thus,  the  environmental  policies  within  such  a  framework  are  determined  by 
domestic considerations alone.
5 A notable exception is Conconi (2003)  who portrays two 
large open economies, which jointly determine their trade and environmental policies. In her 
model, strategic interaction occurs as environmental policies alter the world market prices for 
the traded goods. When a large country taxes the production of a polluting good, the world 
market price rises and as a consequence foreign production and foreign emissions increase 
(thus giving rise to ‘emission leakages’). Conconi shows that under free trade and in the 
presence of strong emission leakages, environmental lobbying might actually lower emission 
taxes as unilaterally formulated taxes will tend to increase degradation.
6   
Our paper deviates from her approach in the assumption that the economies are small on 
the  globalized  world  markets  and  cannot  affect  world  market  prices  through  their 
environmental or trade policies. While there are countries that may affect world market prices 
for certain goods, or even a range of goods, we believe that the majority of countries do not 
have the capacity to influence their terms of trade through a choice of policies. Nonetheless, 
transboundary pollution remains to be an important policy issue for a number of countries. 
We thus model two small open economies which produce a pollution intensive good with 
pollution spilling over to the other country.
7 National governments set their environmental 
policies in order to maximize their political support, which is composed of voter support and 
lobbying contributions. We employ a common agency model developed by Bernheim and 
Whinston  (1986)  and  introduced  by  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994)  in  the  literature  on 
endogenous  policy  formation  and  assume  functionally  specified  interest  groups 
                                                 
5 Strategic interaction in the determination of environmental policy is analyzed in the literature on transboundary 
pollution (e.g. Markusen 1975) and the literature on strategic environmental policy (e.g. Barrett 1994). Both 
strands of literature, however, do not take into account the political-economic rationale in environmental policy 
formation. For a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between trade and environmental policy cf. Rauscher 
(1997), for surveys of the literature see Rauscher (2005). 
6 To our knowledge, apart from Conconi (2003) our study is the only one to address international strategic 
interaction in a model of endogenous environmental policy.  
7 We exclude thus environmental regulation of global pollutants which can be analyzed only in a multi-country 
setting (cf. Barrett 2003).   
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(environmentalists and industrialists). The strategic interaction between the countries results 
from transboundary pollution – foreign environmental regulation is a substitute for domestic 
policy for environmental quality, but it places the burden on foreign rather than domestic 
producers.  Countries  may  be  structurally  different  in  their  preferences  for  environmental 
quality  and  their  political  process,  that  is,  in  the  strength  of  lobby  groups  and  in  the 
importance of social welfare for the governments’ support. 
In this framework, we show that politically optimal tax rates can be either lower or higher 
than the tax rates that welfare maximizing governments would set, depending on the relative 
strength  of  the  lobby  groups  and  the  intensity  of  damage  that  is  caused  by  production. 
Furthermore, we demonstrate that – contrary to the benevolent dictators’ equilibrium – tax 
rates can be negative in equilibrium, for one country or for both. Countries may actually 
subsidize the polluting good rather than tax it. The distortion created by the political process 
may exacerbate the damage to the environment. Under different constellations, it may offset 
the inefficiency created by strategic interaction of the two governments, thereby leading to a 
higher welfare than non-cooperative social planners would be able to achieve.  Our paper is 
the first to study the political economy of environmental policy formation for small open 
economies in the presence of transboundary pollution and thus fills an important gap in the 
literature on endogenous environmental policy.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  introduces  the  two  country  model  with 
transboundary pollution. Section 3 derives the social welfare maximum for non-cooperative 
governments, which serve as  a reference point. Section 4 introduces the common agency 
approach, derives the politically optimal tax rate, characterizes the equilibrium and simulates 
it  for  various  parameter  constellations,  and  derives  comparative-static  results.  Section  5 
concludes.  
2. Transboundary Pollution in a Two Country Model 
The  model  consists  of  two  countries,  which  produce  a  good  that  creates  environmental 
pollution. They  are small open economies on the  goods market but are nevertheless in  a 
situation of strategic interaction, as their pollution spills over to the other country.  
2.1 The economy 
Each economy has two sectors. The first sector produces the non-polluting numeràire good z  
by labor alone. Units are chosen so that the world and domestic price for the numeràire good  
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equal one. Free trade prevails in both markets; goods prices are determined on the world 
markets. By choice of units, wage rate is normalized to unity. The second sector produces the 
polluting  good  x  with  labor  and  a  sector-specific  factor,  which  is  non-tradeable  and 
inelastically supplied. S denotes environmental pollution, which is assumed to affect both 
countries equally and to be quadratic in total production: 
S=β X + X∗    (1) 
The variable β is an exogenously given damage coefficient and X (X*) is the home (foreign) 
production of x. Foreign country variables are denominated with a “*”. The government levies 
a tax on each domestically produced unit of x on the producer (if home production of x is 
positive). The production costs are assumed to be quadratic in the produced quantity.  Sector-
specific income from the production of x is hence defined as:  
Π X = p − t X − X   (2) 
where   is the exogenously given world market price of x. Technology exhibits diminishing 
returns to scale. We assume that in both countries x is produced by only one firm, which 




 p − t   (3) 
Foreign production is obtained symmetrically. Obviously, the countries only produce positive 
amounts of x, if the respective production tax does not exceed the world market price of good 
x. Countries are in a situation of strategic interaction with respect to their production tax rates 
as they affect production and thereby pollution in both countries.   
As we substitute X from Eq. (3), and symmetrically X
*, into Eq. (1), we obtain pollution 




 2p − t − t∗    (4) 
Pollution  increases  with  the  world  market  price,  and  decreases  with  the  tax  rates.  Sector 




 p − t    (5) 
Sector specific income decreases with   while it increases with the world market price. Total 




t p − t   (6)  
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  is redistributed uniformly to all citizens of the respective country.
8 Since an increase in the 
world market price leads to a higher production of X, tax revenue increases with the world 
market price. However, the effect of an increase of the tax rate is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, a higher tax rate leads to more tax income per unit produced. On the other hand, it leads 
to fewer units produced as the production of X becomes less profitable. Hence, tax revenue   
increases (decreases) with t, iff  
 
  −   >  < 0. 
2.2 Population and Utility Functions 
The  home  country  is  populated  by  N  heterogeneous  citizens  of  three  different  types: 
environmentalists, industrialists, and workers. N is normalized to one. All citizens have labor 
income. The total amount of labor in each country equals  l . Each individual has the same 
share of l . Let    be the exogenously given share of environmentalists in the population and 
         be  the  share  of  industrialists  (workers).  Environmentalists  have  disutility  from 
pollution while industrialists and workers are not concerned with pollution. Environmentalists 
and workers derive income from labor only; industrialists also obtain specific factor’s income 
from production of good x.  
Individual maximization problems are defined as follows:  
Each environmentalist solves: 
max
  ,   U  = c  + u c   − S 
s.t.   l + τ = c  + pc  
(7) 
z c  is consumption of the numeràire good z and 
x c  is consumption of good x.       is the 
concave,  differentiable  utility  function  from  consumption  of  x.  The  utility  of  all 
environmentalists is equally affected by total pollution. 
Each industrialist solves 
max
  ,   U  = c  + u c   
s.t.   l + τ +
Π
 α 
= c  + pc  
(8) 
                                                 
8 If taxes are negative, all individuals are taxed uniformly. The assumption of uniform redistribution of the tax 
revenue is in line with the literature and made for simplicity reasons. Cf. Aidt (2010) for an analysis of different 
refunding schemes.    
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The term 
 
   
 in Eq. (8) expresses that sector-specific income is equally proportioned to all 
industrialists. Finally, workers solve 
max
  ,   U  = c  + u c   
s.t.   l + τ = c  + pc  
(9) 
Since prices are given by the world markets, we obtain the following aggregate utility 
functions of environmentalists, industrialists, and workers: 
Ω  t,t∗  ≡ α  −S + τ + l   (10) 
Ω  t,t∗  ≡ Π + α   τ + l   (11) 
Ω  t,t∗  ≡ α  τ + l   (12) 
The  sum  of  the  aggregate  utility  functions  of  each  country  is  defined  as  gross  aggregate 
welfare: 
Ω  t,t∗  ≡ Ω  + Ω  + Ω  = τ + l + Π − α S  (13) 
The term     represents aggregate disutility of the environmentalists from pollution and thus 
to  the  society  as  a  whole.  It  is  the  product  of  total  pollution  and  the  share  of  the 
environmentalists. Sector specific income, by contrast, is independent of the relative size of 
industrialists,  since      merely  defines  among  how  many  industrialists  the  sector-specific 
income  is  divided.  To  obtain  gross  aggregate  welfare  –contingent  on  the  tax  rates  –  we 
substitute Eqs. (4), (5), and (6) in Eq. (13). Rearrangements yield: 
Ω  t,t∗ =
p  − t 
4
− α β 
 t + t∗  
4
+ p p − t − t∗   + l  (14) 
3. Benevolent Dictators’ Solution 
As a reference point for our further analysis, we derive the benevolent dictators’ solution for 
tax rates that are set non-cooperatively.
9 Each government seeks to maximize its country’s 
aggregate welfare.  
                                                 
9 We index this solution with ‘BD’ for benevolent dictator.   
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3.1 Governments’ Reaction Functions 










0  (15) 
Solving  Eq.  (15)  for  t  gives  the  domestic  government’s  reaction  function  for  positive 
production of both firms: 
t̃   =
α β 2p − t∗ 
1 + α β
  (16) 
The reaction function is linear in  ∗, and it is downward sloping. Intuitively, if the foreign tax 
rate  increases,  the  home  country  is  less  affected  by  the  negative  externality  of  foreign 
pollution and can thus reduce its own tax rate. The foreign country’s reaction function is 
isomorphous. For positive values of foreign production , ∗ <  , and thus  ̃   is positive. 
Eq. (16) defines the reaction function only for positive production of both firms, hence for 
  >   and   >  ∗. However, we cannot exclude corner solutions. They occur if one country 
produces so large an amount of the polluting good, thereby producing large quantities of 
pollution in both countries, that it is optimal for the other country not to add to this pollution 
by setting a prohibitive tax rate. Any further pollution damage created by own production 
would exceed the welfare gains from the profits of its firm.  
For instance, if the foreign country sets its tax rate equal or below a lower threshold,    
  ∗, 
it  is  optimal  for  the  home  country  to  set  its  own  tax  rate  prohibitively  high  so  that  its 
production becomes zero. Algebraically    
  ∗ is derived by setting Eq. (16) equal to   and 
solving for  ∗:    
  ∗ =  1 −
 
  β  .
10 Conversely, if the foreign country imposes a prohibitive 
tax,  ∗ ≥  , the home country will set a tax     
   =
  β 
    β, which is derived by setting  ∗ =   
in Eq. (16). In other words, if foreign competition is absent, the home country will optimize 
its own production and pollution by setting a strictly positive tax rate     
   .  
The domestic reaction function is thus defined by: 
                                                 
10 As t* is strictly positive (cf. the foreign equivalent of Eq. (16)) such a situation can only occur if   β >1.  




  t   
   ,   for  t∗ ≥ p          
t̃   ,    for t  
  ∗ < t∗ < p
p ,       for  t∗ ≤ t  
  ∗         
       
   (17) 
The foreign reaction function is isomorphous.  
3.2 Equilibrium 
The three types of possible equilibria are depicted in Figure 1.
11 Either one country sets a 
prohibitive  tax  rate  and  the  other  country  sets  its  best  response  tax  rate  (    
     or      
  ∗, 
respectively) or both countries set non-prohibitive tax rates thereby creating an inner solution 
with both countries producing the polluting good.  
Figure 1: The Equilibrium with Benevolent Dictators 
Panel (1) depicts the situation in which the foreign country sets its prohibitive tax rate and the 
home country reacts by setting its tax rate equal to     
   . This situation requires that    
   >
    
     ,
12 which amounts to the condition   
∗ −    >
 
 . Panel (3) depicts the opposite corner 
solution with the home country setting the prohibitive tax with    
  ∗ >     
  ∗ and    −   
∗ >
 
 .  In  other  words,  corner  solutions  occur  if  the  marginal  damages  from  pollution  differ 
strongly between countries – the country with the higher valuation of environmental quality 
introduces a prohibitive tax while the other keeps producing  with a tax rate equal to the 
marginal damage from production.  
                                                 
11 In Figure 1, we have assumed that   β >1 and   
∗β>1. If for instance   
∗β<1,    
   would be negative and 
therefore the foreign government would never set a prohibitive tax rate. Graphically, the foreign reaction curve 
would not have a kink at    
  ∗ =  , but    
  ∗  ∗ = 0  <  . The equilibrium depicted in panel (1) could not exist. 
12 This condition is intuitive and follows  from the definition of these threshold values: Only if the foreign 
country sets a prohibitive tax rate, which requires   <    
  , will the home country set its best response at     
   . 
For a corner solution to exist and the reaction functions to intersect at  ∗ =  , it is required that     
   <    
  . 
Otherwise an interior solution would result.   
- 10 - 
Panel (2) shows the case in which both countries produce, create externalities from pollution, 
and tax their production. It requires that the two countries do not differ too much in their 
marginal damage from pollution: |   −   
∗| <
 
 . The more polluting production is (i.e. the 
larger β), the more similar the valuations of environment need to be for an interior solution.  
The interior equilibrium       ,     ∗  is given by the intersection of the reaction functions 
 ̃   (from Eq. (16)) and  ̃  ∗, as shown in Figure 1, Panel (2). The domestic tax rate amounts 
to 
T     =
2α βp
1 + β  α  + α 
∗ 
  (18) 
     ∗ is calculated accordingly.  
We can now define the equilibrium for the benevolent dictator setting in the following 
Proposition.  
Proposition 1: 
The equilibrium tax rates on production for two welfare-maximizing governments,    ,   ∗, 
are given by  
 Τ  ,Τ  ∗  =
 
   
 
   
   1  t   
   ,p , for  α 
∗ − α  >
1
β




 3  p,t   
  ∗ , for α  − α 
∗ >
1
β        
   (19) 
with     
   =
  β 
    β and      defined by Eq. (18).  
Equilibrium tax rates are strictly positive. 
The equilibrium is unique and stable.  
Proof: See Appendix 1. ■ 
3.3 Comparative Statics 
Comparative static effects of variations in all exogenous variables (  ,   
∗,  , and  ) are 
straightforward. An increase in    raises    
  ∗ and     
   , and it shifts the domestic reaction  
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curve (bold line) upwards while the foreign reaction curve (thin line) is unaffected.
 13 This is 
depicted in Panel 1 of Figure 2 for an inner solution. The equilibrium shifts from A to B.  
The equilibrium shifts to the Northwest: as a consequence, for large enough variations in 
  ,  an  interior  equilibrium  may  change  into  a  corner  equilibrium  with  the  home  country 
setting a prohibitive tax rate. Conversely a corner solution with the foreign country setting a 
prohibitive  tax  rate  may  turn  into  an  inner  solution.  This  follows  immediately  from 
differentiating Eq. (18) w.r.t.   .
14 An equilibrium in which the domestic tax rate was already 
prohibitive remains unaffected.  
 
Figure 2: An increase in    (panel 1) and in β (panel 2) 
An increase in the damage parameter   raises    
  ∗,   
  ,    
   ,    
  ∗.
15 This is shown in Panel 2 
of Figure 2. Qualitatively, the domestic reaction curve shifts, as depicted in Panel 1. The main 
difference is that the foreign reaction curve shifts in the same way. This is intuitive: As the 
marginal  environmental  damage  increases  in  both  countries,  countries  raise  their  best 
response tax rates. As a result, the range of the corner solutions is enlargened on both ends; 
for the interior solution the resulting new equilibrium (at point C) is characterized by higher 
foreign and domestic tax rates. Analytically, this can be seen by differentiating (18) w.r.t.  . 
                                                 
13 This is seen from 
    
  ∗
   
=
 
      > 0 and 
     
  
   
=
  
          > 0. The increase of    
  ∗ is not proportional to that 
of     
   , which implies that the slope of the reaction function changes. 
14 
      
   
=
 β      
∗  
   β      ∗  
  > 0. Analogously, 
      
   > 0, 
      
   > 0, and 
      
   ∗ < 0.  
15 For instance, 
    
  ∗
   =
 
       > 0 and 
     
  
   =
   
          > 0. 
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4. Interest Based Approach 
We now employ a more realistic setting and assume that governments are self-interested. 
More specifically, we assume a common agency framework (Bernheim and Whinston 1986, 
Grossman and Helpman 1994), in which governments maximize a political support function. 
The political support function is a weighted sum of social welfare and contributions offered 
by political interest groups.  
4.1 The Political Setting 
We  assume  that  individuals  with  similar  interests  form  national  lobby  groups  in  both 
countries  and  offer  campaign  contributions  to  their  governments.  Environmentalists  form 
environmental lobby groups, industrialists form industry lobby groups while workers do not 
organize.
16  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  workers  are  large  in  number  and  cannot 
overcome the free-riding problem described by Olson (1965).  
Let   denote the type of lobby group, E for environmental and I for industry.    defines the 
fraction  of  the  population  that  are  members  of  lobby  group   .  Each  lobby  group  offers 
campaign  contribution  schedules  to  their  country’s  government  denoted  by       .
17  Their 
intention is to influence the government’s choice of environmental policy: These contribution 
schedules are contingent on the pollution tax rate selected by the government and reward the 
policy choice. Each lobby  group’s strategy  consists of a continuous function   :  → ℝ . 
Lobby  groups  offer  a  monetary  payment      to  the  government  for  choosing  the  tax  rate 
  ∈  ,  ∈ ℝ. All contribution schedules are assumed to be non-negative and differentiable 
around the equilibrium point.
18 Lobby groups at home and abroad act independently from 
each other. The foreign pollution tax rate will be taken as given when lobby groups decide on 
their lobby schedules.
19 
                                                 
16 Note that if workers also formed a lobby group, and hence all individuals were organized in lobby groups, the 
tax rates of the political game would equal the benevolent dictator tax rates.  
17 The offers of campaign contributions are neither formal contracts nor do they have to be explicitly announced. 
We only assume that governments know that there is an implicit relationship between their chosen tax rates and 
the contributions from lobby groups which they expect to receive. Campaign contributions should be interpreted 
broadly as campaign funds, support demonstrations, or bribes, since lobby groups employ different strategies to 
influence governments, see Conconi (2003). 
18 Contribution schedules are not differentiable if the assumption of non-negativity becomes binding, that is, 
when the government chooses a tax rate from which follows that    = 0. 
19 We follow Grossman and Helpman (1995) who argue that contribution schedules cannot be observed from 
abroad and thus have no influence on the decisions made abroad. We may then assume that lobby groups take 
foreign policies as given, and decide upon their contribution schedules before the actual foreign tax rate is set.  
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Faced with the lobby contribution offers, the incumbent government selects a pollution tax 
rate with the objective to maximize its own political welfare, i.e. the probability of re-election. 
The  government’s  objective  function  is  a  weighted  sum  of  average  welfare  and  lobby 
contributions. Average welfare is important to the government because chances for re-election 
depend on the well-being of the general voter or citizen. Contributions matter as they can be 
used to influence imperfectly informed voters, e.g. through political advertising (Grossman 
and Helpman 1995). The home government’s objective function is defined as: 
υ= Λ 
 ∈ 
+ aΩ   (20) 
where  L  is  the  set  of  lobby  groups,  and    ≥ 0  is  the  exogenously  given  weight  that  the 
government  places  on  aggregate  social  welfare  relative  to  campaign  contributions.
20  The 
government weighs the political value of lobbying funds (in terms of votes gained) against 
their political cost associated with the loss of welfare in the determination of the weighting 
parameter  . 
4.2 The Formation of Environmental Policy 
The game between the incumbent government and the lobby groups has two stages. In the 
first  stage,  the  lobby  groups  simultaneously  offer  their  campaign  contribution  schedules, 
taking the other lobby group’s strategy as given. In the second stage, the two governments 
select their tax rates, which maximize their objective functions   and  ∗ given the strategic 
interaction with the other government, and collect the corresponding contribution from the 
lobby groups in their country.
21 The lobby groups offer contribution schedules anticipating 
the optimization calculus of their governments in the second stage.  
4.2.1 General Characterization of the Political Equilibrium 
In the two country common agency setup, the equilibrium is characterized by governments 
setting tax rates that maximize their respective political support functions, taking the other 
country’s policy and their national lobby groups’ contribution schedules as given. The lobby 
groups maximize their respective utilities, contingent on national policies, by offering feasible 
                                                                                                                                                         
We also disregard the possibility that interest groups lobby across the border. For such an analysis cf. Hillman 
and Ursprung (1988), Aidt (2005). 
20  For  an  analysis  that  endogenizes  the  weight  of  social  welfare  for  the  political  objective  function  cf. 
Fredriksson et al. (2005). 
21 It is assumed that lobby groups keep their promises and thus make the announced payments.   
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contribution schedules to their governments. They take the other government’s policy and the 
contributions of the other lobby groups in their respective countries as given.  
Applying Lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), or Proposition 1 in Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) to our setup, the equilibrium is characterized as follows. 
Proposition    
      ∈ ,   
∗  ∈ ,    ,   ∗    is  a  Subgame  Perfect  Nash  Equilibrium  of  the  pollution  tax 
game, if and only if: 
(a)   ,  
∗ are feasible for all   ∈  ; 
(b)     maximizes    on T, and    ∗ maximizes  ∗ on T
*; 
(c)     maximizes       −       +   on T ∀   ∈  , and    ∗ maximizes   
∗  ∗  −
  
∗  ∗  +  ∗ on T
* ∀   ∈  ∗; 
(d) ∀   ∈   there exists a     ∈   that maximizes   on T such that         = 0, and 
∀   ∈  ∗ there exists a    ∗ ∈  ∗ that maximizes  ∗ on T
* such that   
∗    ∗  =
0. 
A set of policies     ,   ∗  and the sets of contribution schedules      ∈ ,   
∗  ∈  are a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if conditions (a) to (d) hold. Condition (a) stipulates that 
contribution schedules must be feasible, that is, they must be non-negative and no greater than 
the aggregate income available to the lobby group’s members. Condition (b) ascertains that 
the governments set their pollution taxes      ,    ∗  to maximize their respective objective 
functions     and   ∗  taking the contribution schedules offered by their lobby groups and the 
other country’s policy as given. Condition (c) stipulates that the equilibrium tax rate must 
maximize the joint welfare of the government and each of the national lobby groups, given 
the contribution schedule offered by the other lobby group. In other words, no lobby group   
has a feasible strategy other than the equilibrium strategy that would lead to an increase in the 
joint surplus of the government and the lobby group, of which it could appropriate a share. 
Condition (d) requires that for every lobby group  , a tax policy     exists that gives the 
government the same utility as the equilibrium tax rate     , if the lobby group   does not 
contribute. If no such     existed, lobby group   could increase its welfare by lowering its 
campaign  bid  without  changing  the  government’s  choice  of  tax  policy.  This  would  leave 
lobby group   better off and can thus not be possible in equilibrium (Bernheim and Whinston 
1986). Conditions (c) and (d) ensure that the lobbying schedule is optimal. 
4.2.2 Political-economic Reaction Functions 
Next we derive the home government’s reaction function from Proposition 2. Conditions (b) 
and (c) characterize the optimization calculus of the government.  
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Condition  b                                      ∑
   
    ∈  + a





0  (21) 
and 
Condition  c                                 
   
   −
   






0,∀ j ∈ L  (22) 
Eqs. (21) and (22) imply that, in equilibrium, each lobby group sets its contribution schedule 
such  that,  the  marginal  utility  from  a  change  in  tax    rate  equals  its  marginal  change  in 






,∀ i ∈ L  (23) 











0  (24) 
Next we calculate 
   
     and 
   
    to derive the politically optimal tax rate as a function of the 
other country’s tax rate and the parameters of the model. 
   
    is given by Eq. (15). The lobby 
groups’ marginal utilities w.r.t. the tax rate in Eq. (24) are calculated by substituting Eqs. (4), 






α   β  2p − t − t∗  + 2 
p
2




= α   
p
2
− t  −
1
2
 p − t   (26) 
Environmentalists’ marginal utility with respect to the home tax rate can have either sign (cf. 
Eq. (25)). There are two relevant effects. First, when the domestic tax rate increases, home 
production of x decreases, and hence pollution decreases. Second, total tax revenue changes 
with   and thus the share redistributed to environmentalists.  It increases if 
 
  −   > 0 and 
decreases  otherwise  (cf.  Eq.  (6)).  If  the  environmentalists’  revenue  share  increases,  their 
marginal utility with respect to the home tax rate is unambiguously positive. Otherwise, the 
loss in tax revenue may outweigh the effect of reduced pollution – making 
   
     negative.
22  
                                                 
22 This may happen only for small β because a further increase in the tax rate reduces pollution only negligibly 
but may reduce the tax revenue significantly as the tax base diminishes.  
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Eq.  (26)  shows  that  industrialists’  marginal  utility  from  an  increase  in     is  strictly 
negative:  sector  specific  income     decreases;  tax  revenue  may  increase  or  decrease  (see 
above), but an increase can only partially compensate industrialists for the decline in profits as 
tax revenue is distributed among all members of the society.  
We calculate the reaction function of the home country by substituting Eqs. (15), (25), and 
(26) in Eq. (24), and solving it for t. This yields:  
t̃   =
α β a + 1  2p − t∗  − α p
 a + 1  α β+1  − 2α 
  (27) 
4.3 The Political-economic Equilibrium 
Eq. (27) is derived from the first order condition for a maximum of the political support 
function conditional on the value of the foreign tax rate. As in the benevolent dictator case, 
the  reaction  function  is  linear  in  the  foreign  tax  rate.  The  second  order  condition  for  an 
interior maximum, i.e. 
   
    < 0, requires that   
 a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  > 0  (28) 
If  condition  (28)  was  violated,  the  interior  solution  given  by  (27)  would  characterize  a 
minimum and hence a corner solution would be optimal. Industrialists’ marginal utility would 
increase faster as   is lowered below  ̃   than the sum of the weighted marginal welfare, and 
the  environmentalists’  marginal  utility  would  decrease.
23  It  would  be  optimal  for  the 
government to reduce the tax rate to the minimal amount possible.
 24  
This corner solution is a degenerate case as it is hard to conceive that society directs all its 
resources  from  all  members  of  the  society  by  an  ‘infinitely’  negative  tax  on  production 
towards the industrialist sector only to increase output, profits and environmental degradation 
                                                 
23 This is intuitive as Eq. (28) states that the absolute values of the second derivative of the environmentalists’ 
utility  function    ,   = −  − 
 
   β  plus  the  weighted  second  derivative  of  the  welfare  function      ,   =




   β  exceed the value of the second derivative of the industrialists’ utility function   ,   =
 
  −    . 
24 While the effective tax rate is bounded from above by the value of the price, beyond which production is zero 
and thus a further increase would be inconsequential, a lower bound exists only to the extent that the negative tax 
would  use  up  all  resources  from  the  society  and  redirect  it  to  the  industrial  production.  When  comparing 
     =    with      → −∞  it is immediately clear that the value of the former corner solution falls short of the 
latter. [Strictly speaking the latter is not an infinite, but a finite subsidy with a rate implicitly defined by the gross 
resources of all groups.]  
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to  the  maximum  extent  possible.
25  This  is  not  what  we  observe  and  it  would  require 
unrealistic  parameter  values.  We  thus  exclude  this  uninteresting  case  by  the  following 
assumption: 
Assumption       
 
  a + 1  α β+1  > α   and  
 
  a∗ + 1  α 
∗β+1  > α 
∗ 
Assumption  1  guarantees  a  stable  interior  maximum  of  the  political  support  function 
conditional on the value of the foreign tax rate and stable Nash equilibria as shown below.  
The sign of the tax rate in Eq. (27) is ambiguous — while the denominator is positive 
under  Assumption  1,  the  numerator  can  be  positive  or  negative.  Thus  in  contrast  to  the 
benevolent dictator case the reaction function of a political support maximizing government 
can take on negative values. Given Assumption 1, the reaction function is downward sloping 
in the foreign tax rate, as in the Benevolent Dictator case.  
Eq. (27) defines the reaction function only for positive production of both firms, not for 
corner solutions. Analogous to Section 3, we determine the optimal domestic tax rate for zero 
foreign production,     
   , by setting  ∗ =   in Eq. (27). This yields  
t   
   =
α β a + 1 p − α p
 a + 1  α β+1  − 2α 
  (29) 
The  denominator  is  positive  under  Assumption  1,  the  numerator  can  have  either  sign: 
Contrary to the benevolent dictator case,     
    can take on negative values. A comparison of 
(27) and (29) shows that     
   ≤  ̃  .  
Next we determine the foreign tax rate    
  ∗, below which it is optimal for the home country 
to introduce a prohibitive tax rate   ≥  . 
t  
  ∗ = p 
 a + 1   α β − 1  + α 
α β a + 1 
   (30) 
Note that    




 t   
   ,        for  t∗ ≥ p                   
t̃   ,        for t  
  ∗ < t∗ <        
p ,           for  t∗ ≤ t  
  ∗          
       
   (31) 
                                                 
25 Such a degenerate case could occur only if the environmentalists had little political weight, the pollution 
damage from production was small, the value of welfare consideration of the government’s calculus was low, 
and if the number of industrialists was small (  , , ,   were small).  
- 18 - 
where  ̃    is defined by Eq. (27). As     
    and    
  ∗ can have either sign and are not bounded 
from below, the ‘interior’ reaction function  ̃   may  be only in the first quadrant, in the 
fourth, first, and second, or not in the first quadrant at all. Three possible reaction curves are 
depicted in Figure 3 below.
26  
Figure 3: Domestic reaction curves for the political game 
 
Next  we  analyze  the  possible  equilibria.  The  slopes  of  the  ‘interior’  domestic  reaction 
function t̃   and the inverse of the foreign reaction function t̃  ∗   are  
∂t
∂t∗ = − 
α β a + 1 






 a∗ + 1  α 
∗β+1  − 2α 
∗
α 
∗β a∗ + 1 
 
(32) 
By assumption 1, both reaction curves are downward sloping. Eq. (32) shows that the inverse 
of the foreign reaction curve can be flatter or steeper than the domestic reaction curve, which 
implies the possibility of unstable equilibria.  
4.3.1 Stable equilibria 
We first analyze the case in which 
  
  ∗ >
  ∗  
   ; i.e. the domestic reaction function is flatter 
than the inverse of the foreign reaction function. This is depicted in Figure 4. The line in 
                                                 
26 The reaction functions are depicted for values β=6,    = 0.06, ̅ = 5,  = 1,  = 1 and differ in the value for 
   which takes on the values 0.03, 0.05, and 0.1 for the reaction curves a, b, and c, respectively.   
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boldface depicts a selected domestic reaction function as shown in Figure 3.
27 The thin lines 
show three possible inverse of the foreign reaction curve, which results in three different – 
stable – equilibria. In equilibrium A, the domestic country sets a prohibitive tax rate   =   
and the foreign country sets its best response, which is     
∗ . Equilibrium C is the mirror case 
in which the foreign government denies production in its country and the home country sets 
  =     
   . These corner solutions A and C correspond to the panels 3 and 1 in Figure 1 of 
Section  3.  Yet,  while  in  the  benevolent  dictator  case  both  tax  rates  are  unambiguously 
positive, tax rates may (or may not) be negative in the political game. The interior solution B 
is characterized by both countries producing finite amounts of the polluting good. In Figure 4 
this solution is depicted with positive tax rates for both countries; however home and foreign 
reaction curves could be positioned very differently in the policy space (t, t*) – as shown in 
Figure 3 for the domestic reaction function – so that any combination between taxes and 
subsidies  is  possible  in the  equilibrium.  In  other  words,  it  is  possible  that  both  countries 
subsidize  the  production  of  the  polluting  good  or  that  one  country  taxes  the  negative 
externality while the other country subsidizes it.  
Figure 4: Stable equilibria in the political game 
 
The  conditions  for  corner  solutions  versus  inner  solutions  can  be  seen  in  Figure  4  by 
comparing the values of  tlow
PG,tl 
PG,tlow
PG∗ and t  
PG∗:
28 
                                                 
27 For the sake of clarity we selected only one domestic reaction function, but it is clear from Figure 3, that 
depending on parameter values the domestic reaction function could lie entirely outside the first quadrant or the 
downward sloping part entirely inside the first quadrant. The same is true for the foreign reaction function so that 
a resulting interior equilibrium could lie anywhere in the policy space.  
28 Note that for 
  
  ∗ >
  ∗  
    the condition     
  ∗ <    
  ∗ implies that     
   >    
  .  
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X = 0,X∗ > 0 ⇔ t   
  ∗ < t  
  ∗
X,X∗ > 0 ⇔ t   
  ∗ > t  
  ∗ ⋀  t   
   > t  
   
X > 0,X∗ = 0 ⇔ t   
   < t  
  
  (33) 
The three conditions in (33) describe the equilibria A, B, C in Figure 4. For instance, for 
equilibrium A: tlow
PG∗  < t  
PG∗ . The first line of (33) corresponds with the tax rates   =  , ∗ =
tlow
PG∗, the second line with   ̃  , ̃  ∗ , and the third line with   =     
   , ∗ =   . 
To shed light on the political-economic determinants for the equilibria A, B, and C and 
their position we analyze how the domestic reaction function shifts in response to changes in 
  ,   , β and a. All derivations are relegated to Appendix 2. An increase in α  shifts the 
domestic reaction function to the Northeast and increases    
  ∗ and     
   . An increasing β 
shifts the domestic reaction curve upwards in the same way, however the foreign reaction 
curve shifts as well in the described manner so that a new inner equilibrium, if it exists, must 
lie to the Northeast of the old inner equilibrium. Thus both shifts are similar to the benevolent 
dictator case depicted in Figure 2 (with the exception that they are not confined to the first 
quadrant). Increases in α  and   reduce    
  ∗ and make the reaction curve flatter; they increase 
    
    if   β<1 and decreases it otherwise.
29 The new reaction curve may either be entirely 
below the old reaction curve or intersect with it.  
4.3.2 Unstable equilibria 
We now turn to the case of the foreign reaction curve being flatter than the domestic reaction 
curve, i.e. 
  
  ∗ <
  ∗  
   . This condition implies that both countries react relatively strongly in 
their tax setting to changes in the other country’s tax rate. This case is depicted in Figure 5. 
Again  the  blue  line  in  boldface  depicts  the  domestic  reaction  function;  the  thin  red  line 
represents the foreign reaction function. 
                                                 
29 This follows straightforwardly from differentiating (29) and (30) w.r.t.    and  .   
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Figure 5: Unstable equilibria in the political game 
 
Now, the reaction curves intersect three times with intersection B representing an unstable 
equilibrium and points A and C representing stable corner solutions. That is, if countries react 
relatively strongly to their opponent’s tax setting, initial conditions or coincidence decide 
about which country will produce the polluting good, possibly under heavy subsidization, and 
which country will not produce the good at all. In that case it is no longer the political-
economic  characteristics  of  the  two  countries  alone  which  decide  about  the  pattern  of 
production and pollution, but any factor that happens to tip the unstable equilibrium to the left 
or the right of point B with the consequences being most radical. A government may heavily 
subsidize  the  production  of  the  polluting  good,  which  it  would  have  banned  under  only 
slightly different circumstances. Overall, the possibility of unstable outcomes makes corner 
solutions more likely.  
For this case the equilibria can be characterized as follows 
t   
  ∗ < t  
  ∗⋀  t   
   > t  
   ⟹  X = 0,X∗ > 0
t   
  ∗ < t  
  ∗⋀  t   
   < t  
   ⟹  X = 0,X∗ > 0    X,X∗ > 0
t   
  ∗ > t  
  ∗⋀  t   
   < t  
   ⟹  X > 0,X∗ = 0
 or  X > 0,X∗ = 0  (34) 
The second line refers to the situation depicted in Figure 5. The comparative static properties 
are the same as described above. Note that increases in   and    will make the reaction curve 
flatter, which may turn an unstable equilibrium into a stable one.  
We  now  turn  to  the  derivation  of  the  equilibrium.  For  an  interior  political-economic 
equilibrium (     ,     ∗  the ‘interior’ reaction functions  ̃   and  ̃  ∗ need to intersect. From 
Eq. (27) and its foreign equivalent follows 
T     = p    1 +
α 
∗  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α   +  a∗ + 1  α  2 − α 
∗β  −  a + 1  1 + β α  − α 
∗   
 a + 1  α β+1  a∗ + 1 − 2α 
∗  +  a∗ + 1  α 
∗β+1  a + 1 − 2α   + 4α α 
∗ −  a + 1  a∗ + 1 
   (35)  
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We can now summarize our main result in the following Proposition. 
Proposition 3: 
(i) The equilibrium tax rates on production for two political support-maximizing governments, 
   ,   ∗, are given by  
(1)  T    ,T    ∗  for  t   
  ∗ > t  
  ∗ ⋀  t   
   > t  
   
(2)  p,t   
  ∗   for t   
  ∗ < t  
  ∗ ⋀  t   
   > t  
   
(3)  t   
   ,p  for t   
  ∗ > t  
  ∗ ⋀  t   
   < t  
   
(4)  Multiple equilibria  for t   
  ∗ < t  
  ∗ ⋀  t   
   < t  
   
where     
    is defined by Eq. (29) and    
  ∗ by Eq. (30).  
(ii) Equilibria (1) to (3) are unique and stable. In situation (4) there exist two stable corner 
solutions with   ,    
  ∗  and      
   ,   and an unstable interior equilibrium with     
  
,   
  ∗
 .  
(iii) Equilibrium tax rates      ,     ∗,    
    ,    
  ∗ may be positive or negative. ■ 
 
4.4 Comparison of the Political Game with the Benevolent Dictator Solutions 
The conditions (1) to (4) in Proposition 3 can be rewritten in terms of the parameter of the 
model, which allows an easier comparison to the benevolent dictator case as described in Eq. 
(19).  Using Eqs. (29), (30) and the other country’s equivalent, we can rewrite the conditions 
in Proposition 3 as: 















(2)  p  ,t   
  ∗ 
 
  1 −
 ∗  
∗
 ∗     <   δ − α 
∗δ∗and α δ − α 
∗δ∗ > −
 
  1 −
    
       
(3)  t   
   ,p   
 
  1 −
 ∗  
∗
 ∗     >   δ − α 
∗δ∗and α δ − α 
∗δ∗ < −
 
  1 −
    
       

















  is a measure of the political distortion in the home country. It is defined as:  :=
   
      
>
1. The definition of  ∗ is analogous.  
For  the  inner  solution  in  the  benevolent  dictator  case,  countries  need  to  be  not  too 
dissimilar in the sense that the disutility from pollution must not differ by more than 
 
  in 
absolute terms, i.e. |   −   
∗| <
 
 , as shown in Eq. (19). For the political game a comparable  
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condition exists that bounds a weighted difference in the α s from above and below for a 
stable interior equilibrium; yet this difference now takes the political distortions into account 
and thus the lower and upper limits are different. Comparing the two sets of conditions in the 
above table and in Eq. (19) shows that it is impossible to determine in general whether the 
area with interior solutions is larger in the benevolent dictator case or in the political game.  
Comparing       in Eq. (35) with       in Eq. (18) demonstrates that the politically optimal 
tax rate can be smaller or larger than the tax rate that a benevolent dictator would set for the 
same economy; the relative magnitudes depend on the structure of the political, economic and 
ecological system. We illustrate this with the following three examples displayed in Table 1. 
Columns 2-4 give the values for the political economic equilibrium and for the benevolent 
dictators’  equilibrium  (in  parentheses)  for  three  different  sets  of  parameter  values.  All 
equilibria  are  interior  and  stable  and  represent  maxima  of  the  governments’  conditional 
objective functions (i.e., Assumption 1 is fulfilled and the domestic reaction curve is flatter 
than the inverse of the foreign reaction curve).
30  
Table 1: Simulated equilibria in the benevolent dictator and the political game 
  Case (1)  Case (2)  Case (3) 
Parameter values  α  = α 
∗ = 0.1,α  = α 
∗ = 0.1, p = 1,   l = l∗ = 1 
  a = a∗ = 1 
β = 1 
a = 10,a∗ = 1 
β = 1 
a = a∗ = 1 
β = 10 
Variables       
Home tax rate PG (BD)  -0.5 (0.17)  0.21 (0.17)  0.73 (0.67) 
Foreign tax rate PG (BD)  -0.5 (0.17)  -0.74 (0.17)  0.73 (0.67) 
Home production level PG (BD)  0.75 (0.42)  0.39 (0.42)  0.14 (0.17) 
Foreign production level PG (BD)  0.75 (0.42)  0.87 (0.42)  0.14 (0.17) 
Total Pollution PG (BD)  2.25 (0.69)  1.59 (0.69)  0.74 (1.11) 
Home Welfare PG (BD)  0.96 (1.17)  1.08 (1.17)  1.04 (1.03) 
Foreign Welfare PG (BD)  0.96 (1.17)  0.95 (1.17)  1.04 (1.03) 
                                                 
30 It is straightforward to construct examples in which the political game results in corner solutions and the 
benevolent dictator game does not and vice versa. Results are available upon request.    
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Overall Welfare PG (BD)  1.92 (2.34)  2.03 (2.34)  2.08 (2.06) 
Note: PG denotes values for the political game; BD denotes values for the benevolent dictator game. 
They are given in parentheses.  
 
In case 1, both countries are symmetric; the welfare maximizing governments would levy a 17 
percent tax on the value of the output of their polluting firms. Under the same parameter 
values, the political-support maximizing governments, however, would subsidize production 
at a rate of 50 percent, with the consequence that production and pollution is significantly 
higher. In this case, the political-economic calculus leads to a sizeable deterioration in welfare 
and  a  strong  increase  in  environmental  degradation  as  the  governments  cater  to  the 
industrialist lobby group.  
In case 2, both countries have the same parameter values as in case 1 with the exception 
that the domestic government places a much larger weight on welfare considerations in its 
political-economic  calculus  (i.e.  the  parameter     is  higher).  The  benevolent  dictators’ 
equilibrium  is  thus  the  same  as  in  case  1,  but  the  political  equilibrium  is  qualitatively 
different: The domestic government now levies a tax rate, which is even higher than in the 
benevolent dictator case while the foreign country subsidizes production, yet more strongly 
than in case 1. The comparison between the two political economic equilibria in case 1 and 2 
shows the interdependence of the political support maximizing governments’ behaviors: As 
the domestic government is taxing the production of the polluting good thereby reducing the 
negative  externality,  the  foreign    government  can  increase  its  subsidy  further  thereby 
enhancing its political support. It is free-riding on the domestic government. Conversely, the 
domestic government anticipates such behavior and therefore taxes production more heavily 
than if the foreign government would tax its production as well. The welfare in the political 
equilibrium in case 2 is higher than in case 1, but it is lower than in the benevolent dictator 
case.  
Case 3 is again completely symmetrical and has the same parameter values as case 1 
except for the damage parameter β, which is now much higher. As a result, the benevolent 
dictators now tax production more heavily than in case 1 and the resulting welfare level is 
lower. This is intuitive. More striking, however, is the comparison between the political game 
and  benevolent  dictators’  game.  The  political  support  maximizing  governments  tax 
production of the polluting good more heavily than a benevolent dictator would! As a result 
environmental degradation is lower and the welfare is higher in the political game. The reason 
for this result is that the distortion created by the political-economic calculus — “too” high  
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tax  rates  —  now  counteracts  the  distortion  created  by  the  strategic  interaction  of  two 
benevolent dictators, who set tax rates on transboundary pollution too low.  
We summarize these findings in the following corollary.  
Corollary 1: 
(i)  The tax rates of the benevolent dictator can be either higher or lower than the tax 
rates set by political support maximizing governments.  
(ii)  The  political  game  may  result  in  higher  or  in  lower  welfare  than  the  strategic 
interaction of non-cooperative benevolent dictators.  
(iii)  The welfare is lower if both tax rates are lower than in the benevolent dictator case. It 
may be higher if both tax rates exceed the benevolent dictators’ tax rates.  
The intuition behind this result is that there are different forces that shift the equilibrium from 
the benevolent dictator solution to the political game solution. The direction of the political 
distortion depends on the relative strengths of the interest groups (and the value of a). For 
instance, if α  and β are high, an increase in the tax rate reduces production and thus profits, 
but translates into a large reduction in disutility from pollution. Thus, the environmentalists 
will be lobbying more strongly for an increase in the tax rate than if the damage coefficient 
and  the  size  of  the  environmentalists  were  lower.  The  resulting  political-economic 
equilibrium will imply a higher tax rate.
31 The political-economic equilibrium is affected in 
addition by the redistribution of the tax revenue: While in the benevolent dictator case it is a 
mere redistribution of income between members of the society that does not affect overall 
welfare, this redistribution affects the political equilibrium as not all groups of the society will 
reward additional income from tax proceeds as they are not organized (the workers). The 
lower a, the stronger the political distortion; for   ⟶ ∞ the political game solution converges 
to the benevolent dictator solution.  
If the politically optimal tax rates are higher than the benevolent dictators’ tax rates, they 
may  reduce  a  distortion  that  is  created  by  the  strategic  interaction  of  the  two  welfare-
maximizing  governments.  Non-cooperative  governments  internalize  the  externality  of 
transboundary pollution only to the extent that pollution affects domestic welfare. As a result, 
tax rates are too low compared with joint welfare maximization (Markusen 1975).
32 If tax 
rates are lower than the in benevolent dictator  case, the political distortion reinforces the 
distortion created by strategic interaction and welfare is even lower.  
                                                 
31 Note that both profits and disutility from pollution are convex in the tax rate, however with different signs and 
magnitudes.  
32 Of course tax rates could be so high that the distortion from strategic interaction is strongly overcompensated, 
resulting in a lower welfare level than in the benevolent dictator case.    
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The fact that a political support maximizing government may pursue a welfare superior 
policy compared to a government that seeks to maximize welfare is thus contingent on a 
situation of international strategic interaction. It cannot arise in the analysis of a small open 
economy (e.g. Fredriksson 1997), where the political-economic calculus of the government 
unambiguously reduces overall welfare. Yet it may be relevant for a number of situations in 
which environmental damage is high and  environmental policies affect the environmental 
quality of neighboring states.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have analyzed endogenous environmental policy formation of two countries 
that are small on the world markets, but are linked through transboundary pollution. Three 
major results emerge. First, the environmental policy adopted by self-interested governments 
may or may not be more stringent than by social welfare maximizing, but uncooperative 
governments. Thus the distortion created by the transboundary pollution may be exacerbated 
or may be alleviated by the distortion created through the political system. Under certain 
circumstances, a political process that does not take all individuals into consideration equally, 
may  work  in  favor  of  the  society  at  large.  Second,  the  space  of  optimal  policies  in  the 
political-economic game is larger than in the game played by benevolent dictators: While 
uncooperative benevolent governments will always set positive but inefficiently low tax rates 
(from the perspective of joint welfare maximization), the politically optimal tax rates may be 
too high to optimally internalize the transboundary externality, but they may also be too low. 
Political  support  maximizing  governments  may  indeed  subsidize  the  production  of  the 
polluting  good  rather  than  taxing  it.  In  equilibrium,  it  is  possible  that  one  government 
subsidizes the production of the polluting good while the other taxes it. Third, the political 
distortion might create instability: While the resulting equilibria in the case of social welfare 
maximizing governments are always unique and stable, the possibility of multiple equilibria 
in the political game with one equilibrium being unstable cannot be excluded. This increases 
the probability of corner solutions with one country ceding production to the other.  
We  believe  that  the  strategic  interaction  in  environmental  policy  formation  of  self-
interested governments in the presence of transboundary, but non-global pollution has so far 
not  been  sufficiently  examined.  Our  theoretical  analysis  is  aimed  at  improving  our 
understanding of this issue, the scope of which can be broadened in many ways. First, it 
would  be  interesting  to  study  what  the  incentives  for  political  support  maximizing 
governments  are  to  cooperate  and  what  the  welfare  effects  would  be.  It  is  obvious  that  
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international  cooperation  would  eliminate  the  distortion  created  by  strategic  interaction 
(Markussen 1975), but could also lead to a welfare deterioration if the political distortion has 
an offsetting effect. Second, interest groups could be assumed to lobby across the border. 
While industrialist lobby groups in both countries have opposing interests with respect to the 
national regulations; they favor higher regulation abroad and lower at home, environmentalist 
groups’ interests in both countries are aligned. Third, extending the model to a multi-country 
setup  with  incomplete  spill-overs  would  provide  many  important  insights  on  real  world 
applications of regional pollution. 
Our  model  shows  how  distortions  created  by  the  strategic  interaction  of  national 
governments interact with distortions created by the political processes in both countries. We 
show that these two sets of distortions could either reinforce or counteract each other. Which 
scenario is more realistic, however, remains an empirical question. It could be the subject of a 
fruitful empirical analysis.     
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Uniqueness and stability of the equilibria in the benevolent dictator case 
In this appendix we demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the welfare maximizing non-
cooperative equilibrium of Section 3.  
First, we note that both reaction curves  ̃   and  ̃  ∗ are linear in the opponent‘s tax rate (cf. 
Eq. (16)). In the (t*, t) space, the slope of the ‘interior’ domestic reaction curve  ̃  , is 
       
  ∗ = −
  β
    β >-1,   
 while the slope of the inverse of the ‘interior’ foreign reaction curve, t̃  ∗  , is  
      ∗  
  ∗ = −
    
∗β
  
∗β < −1.   
For  t∗ >   and for  ∗ <    
∗ , the domestic reaction function is flat, while the inverse of the 
foreign reaction function is vertical for   >   and for   <    
  . That is, the inverse of the 
foreign reaction curve is always steeper than the domestic reaction curve and thus the reaction 
curves  t   and t  ∗ intersect exactly once. The resulting equilibrium is thus unique and 
stable.   ∎ 
Appendix 2: Properties of the reaction curve in the political game 
We first derive that the reaction function in the political game is downward sloping. This is 
shown by differentiating Eq. (27) w.r.t. the foreign tax rate.  
∂t̃  
∂t∗ = −
α β a + 1 
 a + 1  α β+1  − 2α 
< 0 
An analogous expression can be derived for the inverse of the foreign reaction function.  
Next  we  analyze  the  comparative  static  properties  of  the  domestic  reaction  function  with 
respect to   ,   , β and a. We calculate the change of    
  ∗ and     
    in response to a change in 





p α  + a 
α 
 β a + 1 
> 0 




p a + 1  α β+aβ+1 
  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  




a p + 1  +  a + 1 β α  3p − 2t∗  + p  + β a  + 1  2p − t∗ 
  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  
  > 0 
An increase in α  shifts the domestic reaction function to the Northeast; at the same time the 
range of foreign tax rates increases, for which the domestic government sets prohibitive tax 
rates as best response. The tax rate for zero foreign production increases as well. The slope of 
the reaction function can either increase or decrease:  
∂ t̃  
∂t∗∂α 
= −
β a + 1  a + 2α  − 1 
  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  
  ≶ 0 
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If    increases, the range of foreign tax rates for which the home country sets prohibitive 
taxes  decreases  and  the  reaction  curve  becomes  flatter.      







α β a + 1 
< 0 




p a + 1  α β − 1 
  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  
  ≶ 0 
∂ t̃  
∂t∗∂α 
=
2α β a + 1 
  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  
  > 0 






α β a + 1   < 0 




pα  1 − α β 
  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  
  ≶ 0 




  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  




α  p − α β 3p − 2t∗  
  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  
  ≶ 0 
In other words, if a increases the new reaction curve is flatter than the old reaction curve and 
it may lie completely below the old one or may intersect with it.  
An increase in   shifts the domestic reaction curve to the Northeast, which is qualitatively the 
same reaction to an increase in   . However, if   rises, the foreign reaction curve shifts as 






p a + 1 − α  
α β  a + 1 
> 0 




pα  a + 1  a + 1 − α  
  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  
  > 0 
∂ t̃  
∂t∗ ∂β
= −
α  a + 1  a + 1 − 2α  
  a + 1  α β+1  − 2α  





p a∗ + 1 − α 
∗ 
α 
∗β  a∗ + 1 
> 0 





∗ a∗ + 1  a∗ + 1 − α 
∗ 
  a∗ + 1  α 
∗β+1  − 2α 
∗ 
  > 0 
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